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NIS BULLETIN
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
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THE NIS BULLETIN IS PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, 2461 EISENHOWER AVENUE, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22331.

THIS BULLETIN IS INTENDED FOR THE USE AND PROFESSIONAL ENHANCEMENT OF ALL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL, SPECIAL AGENTS AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS ASSIGNED TO NIS WORLDWIDE.

FIELD COMPONENTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO SUBMIT ITEMS FOR PUBLICATION ON A CONTINUING BASIS. AN ARTICLE IN THE APRIL 1972 ISSUE OF THE NIS BULLETIN DISCUSSES THE DETAILS REGARDING SUBMISSIONS TO THIS BULLETIN.

FROM THE DIRECTORS DESK



The beginning of a new year is traditionally a time for review and personal stock-taking. How did we fare, and what do prospects look like for the future? For my part, it seems scarcely possible that January marks the midpoint of my tenure as Director. In some ways, time seems to have slipped by in the flick of an eyelash. The diploma next to my desk says I (successfully?) completed the Basic Agent Training Course in May 1973. Can it have been that long ago that I was struggling to learn the rudiments of our profession? We have come a long way together over the past eighteen months, and at this half way mark I would like to share some thoughts with you on what we have realized as a team, and what remains to be done.

First, I think we have made excellent progress toward strengthening the concept of a centrally directed organization, and toward uniform support to the fleet and shore bases. Despite the many crises we have weathered (and those that are with us still) the quality of our professionalism has never been higher. We have been able to revitalize our training programs, and expansion of our agent corps is enabling development of the management base we will need in the years to come. The

ability of our personnel in the field has fostered awareness and confidence in commands, and our services have come into increasing demand. The measure of our contribution in the maintenance of good order and discipline is impossible to determine, but it is unquestionably a meaningful one, and directly a result of the skill and dedication of our front line agents. I am tremendously proud of the "can do" spirit evident throughout the NIS, and consider it our greatest asset.

Charting our course has not been without its frustrations, and this has never been more apparent than in the task of trying to get the tools to do the job. The gapping of our enlisted billets continues to be a problem, and I see no immediate relief. Better balance is needed in overall clerical support, and I think prospects are a bit better in this area. Our overage vehicle fleet needs redress, and again I think we will be able to realize improvement in numbers, condition and distribution. A more troubling question is whether we have been able to give a full measure of investigative effort to all cases that come to us, or whether the pressures of backlog and alternate priorities have invited more limited attention to the less serious ones? The additional personnel being brought aboard will help erase this problem if in fact it exists, but these increases will also mean far heavier training responsibilities for both Headquarters and the field. As we assimilate these new agents throughout the year, I would look for a balance to be struck that will permit fuller case attention without loss in timeliness of completion.

Looking down the road, we are targeting to have a revised Investigations Manual in the hands of every agent this year. Negotiations are in progress toward a new SECNAV instruction setting forth the responsibilities of both NIS and command as regards investigative, counter-intelligence and security matters, and should be finalized in the near term. Our Agent Afloat program is already undergoing change. Although a number of decisions remain, we are shifting from the all-volunteer concept to one of Headquarters selection based on demonstrated ability, experience and promotional potential. Selectees will be notified well in advance, and the feasibility of associated PCS assignments is also being examined.

1974 saw events of often stunning consequence that affected us as individuals and as a nation. Watergate, inflation/recession, the energy crisis -- these and more have clearly changed our lives, and further changes are certain to come this year. Our work may become more difficult, but our goals will remain the same. Together, I am confident we will persevere.

Samuel Martini

SECURITY VIOLATION INVESTIGATIONS (CATEGORY 5)

ROIs documenting Category 5 investigative matters continue to be received which indicate that NIS policy regarding the handling of evidence and proper warning of suspects is not being followed. Security violations normally result from the failure to follow prescribed security regulations or perpetration of acts in violation of military law (UCMJ) or federal law (Espionage Statutes, Title 18, USC (792-798)). Investigations therefore serve as a basis for remedial action to either correct procedural deficiencies or effect punitive action against the offenders, or both. Severe penalties can be invoked for the compromise of defense information by design, by gross negligence, or by failure to report a known loss of defense information. Security violation investigations must be approached as a criminal not an administrative matter. It is mandatory that items of evidence that are germane to the offense be handled as evidence pursuant to existing NIS policy. Moreover, all suspects to the offense should be properly advised of their rights.

The "Security Manual" - OPNAV INST 5510.1E - is the Navy's supplement to the DOD Information Security Program Regulation and provides guidance specifically applicable to the Navy for protection of its classified information. It would behoove all of us to periodically review the "Security Manual", especially Chapter VI (Compromise of Classified Information).

FIREARMS TRAINING TIPS

Recently, during the course of some apprehension exercises the .357 magnum revolvers of two of the four apprehending agents fell to the ground during the course of a struggle to subdue the suspects. The agents who lost their weapons immediately blamed their holster for the embarrassing situation which in the real world could have been a deadly one; and to say the least was rather hard on the revolvers. The agents, when queried concerning the adjustment of their holsters, sort of gave a blank look. The message was clear - holster adjustment?????

All of us at times have a tendency to take some of our equipment for granted and one of the more important parts of a Special Agent's equipment is the holster in which he carries his firearm. In the case of the issue holster for the .357 magnum, there is an adjustment mechanism designed into the holster when properly set will, under reasonable conditions, maintain the weapon in its holster yet allow it to be drawn swiftly when desired. But this condition will only prevail when the Special Agent pays the necessary attention to his holster and insures that it is properly adjusted.

To adjust this .357 magnum holster, there is a movable piece of leather on the rear of the holster which is placed between the inside and outside pieces of leather and held in place by a screw. To properly adjust the holster, the weapon should be fully inserted in the holster, then the piece of leather moved to apply

pressure against the frame of the revolver immediately forward of the trigger guard. The leather should be tightened until a proper adjustment is reached where adequate pressure on the revolver has exerted to hold it in its holster under most conditions and yet allow the agent to draw it. Then the screw should be tightened and the adjustment checked. To ignore this adjustment factor over a period of time, because of the flexibility of leather, will cause the holster to slightly increase in size and loosen its grip on the revolver. Also, over a period of time the screw holding the adjustment has a tendency to work loose which may cause an improper or loose adjustment and if the condition is ignored, eventually the screw will fall out.

The maintenance of the proper adjustment of a Special Agent's holster should be viewed no differently than the routine check that the agent gives his weapon to insure that it is loaded and in proper operating condition. The same care could be given to an agent's holster. This routine check could save your life!

NIS HISTORICAL ARCHIVES

Response to the appeal for ONI/NIS memorabilia contributions as outlined in the last issue of the NIS Bulletin has been encouraging. NISO's San Francisco and Charleston have forwarded documents and a miniature "U. S. Intelligence Officer" Badge respectively, and their contributions are appreciated. The Badge reportedly



dates back to the First World War. NISHQ is still desirous of collecting additional items for permanent retention. Inquiries regarding any items being considered for contribution, may be directed to Special Agent W. F. Gray and/or Special Agent G. D. Mulligan, (Code 252). Of particular interest, and as yet still unaccounted for is a set of original credentials bearing the signature of then Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels. NISO San Francisco has provided a copy of similar credentials, however, the original credentials, which once were on display in the Training spaces in the Fairmont Building are still unaccounted for.

VEHICLE FORFEITURES

A NISO advises of successful cooperation on the part of the Drug Enforcement Agency and/or U. S. Attorneys in seizure and forfeiture of privately owned vehicles which were used for transportation of illegal drugs aboard military reservations. There have been four vehicles seized, and forfeiture proceedings have either been executed or are in the process. The deterrent effect of such forfeitures is obvious and must have some influence in at least keeping illegal drugs off bases. It is pointed out that in so many of the illegal drug violations, little or nothing happens to the suspects by a judicial process. When a military member suddenly loses a \$3,000 vehicle because of his improprieties aboard, he and his shipmates who learn of this will surely think twice before jeopardizing themselves in this regard again. (Source: NISO New Orleans)

STAY ALERT - STAY ALIVE

The Stay Alert Stay Alive item for this publication of the NIS Bulletin is illustrated in the following photographs. The concealment item, a wallet holster which accommodates a derringer pistol, has been encountered in the field and is commercially available. The Wallet Holster is easily overlooked, or more often, not identified for what it is during search procedures and represents a real danger to law enforcement personnel:



NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE
SERVICE

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES

During a recent narcotics operation in San Diego with local authorities, several occupants of a van approached the fixed surveillance position of local authorities and NIS Special Agents and announced they were monitoring their activities and wanted to see what a bunch of "narcs" look like.

Aside from exposing the confidential informant and unnerving them, the investigators considered the intrusion as an unprofessional contribution to the operation. A brief spirited discussion and reconstruction of the informants' confidence followed. It became apparent that the intruders had been monitoring the operation on a citizens band scanner.

Local authorities advised that monitoring by civilian's band scanner was not illegal and the observers could not be detained for identification.

In order to minimize/avoid similar intrusion, local authorities have reinstated the following precautions which are strictly adhered to:

a. Radio transmissions are kept to a minimum.

b. Proper names are never used.

c. Street names are avoided if possible.

d. Observation is maintained for intruders.

e. Spirited discussions will be avoided in the presence of the CI. (This article was contributed by Special Agent Gerald L. STRAUSS, NISRA San Diego)

THE CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER

A NISO reports regarding advantages obtained in training through receipt of a publication entitled "The Criminal Law Reporter". It is received weekly and reports meaningful summaries of legal decisions regarding federal, state and local courts. The main summaries of concern are, of course, the federal decisions, which include COMA opinions. Certain articles selected are reproduced and forwarded to the NISRAs to be utilized during in-service training sessions. Of particular significance are those summaries which show prejudicial investigative errors regarding situations which the investigator may have done differently and just as efficiently had he prior knowledge of the legal ramifications of his actions. It should also be noted that COMA decisions are frequently received much earlier through the publication than through receipt of "advance opinions" which are disseminated at the direction of JAG. The publication is written in a manner readily understandable by the layman vice the legally trained. Local JAG officers could be contacted for assistance if deemed necessary. The subscription may be obtained through a GSA Contract No. GS-OIS-5337 at a cost of \$138.00 annually. The

publisher is the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 3231 25th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., 20037 (Source: NISO New Orleans)

UNEXPLAINED DEATH OF FILIPINO MALES

A preliminary investigation conducted upon notification that a body was found in a barracks was initiated to determine possible criminal activity. Investigation revealed the victim was a 27 year old filipino, and disclosed nothing which would indicate homicide or suicide. The County Medical Examiner advised his autopsy was inconclusive, as there were no explicable medical reasons for victim's death, and requested NIS investigative assistance in determining the victim's activities during the preceding 48-hour period. Interview of associates and shipmates determined victim to be of good habits, character and reputation. Victim neither smoked, drank alcoholic beverages, nor was ever known or suspected of using drugs. Investigation revealed victim along with 13 other filipinos ate filipino food about four hours prior to retiring for the night. The County Medical Examiner subsequently advised that in the absence of foul play, suicide, and known medical reasons for victim's expiration, he attributed the death to "Bangungut".

"Bangungut" can best be described as sudden unexplained death of a previously healthy

filipino man during sleep. "Bangungut" is the tagalog word for nightmare ("bangun" - to rise and "ungut" - to moan). Victims appear to be subjected to violent, terrifying dreams, from which they cannot be awakened. Documented clinical inquiries described the stereotyped victim as a healthy, well-developed non-obese filipino man, usually in the third or fourth decade of life, who goes to bed one or more hours after having eaten a heavy typically filipino meal. The victim experiences no discomfort following the meal, but sometime after he has fallen asleep, he is seen to move about in bed in a most agitated manner, groaning, yelling and coughing, and often with frothy fluid coming from the mouth. In most instances, the victim is dead before medical help is available. At this time, a medically defined cause of death attributed to "bangungut" is unknown. (This article was contributed by Special Agent Joe F. OLIVERI, NISRA Corpus Christi)

CRIME PREVENTION

The administration of justice in the courtroom has taken on a new dimension relative to the speedy adjudication of criminal cases because of the increased demands for prosecution which have overloaded the court dockets and strained the capacity of our present judicial machinery. This has resulted in the necessity for plea bargaining, reduction in charges and sentences, and declination of prosecution, in the interest of the government, in cases where the evidence is not preponderant. From this, it is concluded that the concept of the

administration of justice through law enforcement may be improved in part through an expanded dimension in crime prevention by research and analysis for improvement of security, accountability of property, and emphasis on individual responsibility in the protection of government property.

Crimes against government property, in the area of theft, wrongful appropriation, and destruction are prevalent at military installations and after the fact investigations often times provide evidence that a theft or wrongful destruction can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that the property was not properly secured. With regard to thefts, which are more common, many are committed by the opportunist type thief who takes property that is left unattended and unsecured. In some cases the property is not serialized, plant accounted, or marked for identification, and proof of ownership cannot be established. This increases the chance of the property being stolen and complicates investigative effort to recover the property.

Most military commands are receptive to constructive recommendations for collective efforts in the protection of government property through crime prevention techniques. Pursuant to remedial physical and operational security procedures, some USN commands are now doing vulnerability type surveys on a continuous basis. The practice of marking popular demand items, not serialized or plant accounted, has been initiated. Studies have been made regarding the feasibility of full time billets dedicated to this function.

Spot check type searches of privately owned vehicles are being conducted. The use of closed circuit television and related equipment in problem areas such as warehouses and open storage areas can be utilized with success. Because of the increased amount of gasoline thefts, some military commands are now in the process of using phosphorescent dye in government gasoline, which is detectable by use of an ultraviolet light.

Security is the backbone of crime prevention as it relates to larceny and wrongful destruction and it requires a constant vigil with innovations commensurate with changing conditions. It requires a collective effort, with demands on individual responsibility, and its horizons are limited only by our imagination. (This article was contributed by Special Agent Paul CLARK, NISSU China Lake)

COLLECTION AND PRESERVATION OF VOLATILE LIQUIDS IN ARSON INVESTIGATIONS

Volatile liquids represent evidence that is particularly difficult to locate, collect and preserve; however, if found and properly handled, often represent a prima facie establishment of the willful and malicious element of the offense of arson.

Volatile liquids are best identified by their odors. They tend to collect in low, protected areas within the fire scene, where they can soak into material. Once soaked into another material, the liquid is essentially fed into the fire through a wick effect until extinguishment.

If the fire is extinguished before all of the liquid fuel is consumed, identifiable residues will remain. To locate these residues it is necessary to lift covering debris, place one's nose in close proximity to the suspected material, and attempt to detect the odors of volatile liquids. Good locations in burned areas include, but are certainly not limited to: underneath baseboards, in carpets, in stacks of porous material such as cloth or papers, and particularly in areas where debris such as ceiling tiles or draperies have fallen to the floor and protected what lay underneath.

Many fire departments utilize flammable vapor detection devices, which will not only identify vapors as flammable, but will measure their concentration in parts per million. The Special Agent should be aware that generally, these devices are less effective than the human nose in detecting the presence of volatile liquids, and do not identify the liquid giving off the vapor, but merely identify it as flammable. These devices can be useful however, when the laboratory fails to identify the accelerant at all, then the mere fact that a flammable liquid was present, would be the next best evidence.

The indiscriminate collection of burned debris which does not have a suspicious odor about it for the purpose of identifying a liquid accelerant, is futile. As a general rule, if it cannot

be detected by odor, do not collect it for a laboratory examination for liquid accelerants. With regard to run off water resultant from fire fighting, it can be generally stated that if a film of suspected liquid accelerant cannot be observed floating on top of the water, it is not worth collecting. The best rule to follow with regard to suspected liquid accelerants is, if you can see it or smell it, collect it.

The experienced fire investigator is aware of many indicators in fire patterns which tell him that liquid accelerants have probably been used. It is good practice to depend upon the fire investigator to locate suspicious areas for the collection of debris samples.

When collecting samples suspected of containing liquid accelerant residue, the best containers are new paint cans or glass jars with screw-on lids. The container must be airtight. Plastic containers, particularly plastic bags are worthless for this purpose. As soon as suspected debris is detected, it should immediately be placed in a suitable container. The container may be left at the collection point as the agent moves on making more collections, and the agent can then return, label the container and photograph it in place, prior to collection.

Preservation of volatile liquids is a most difficult problem, and time is the worst enemy. By their nature, volatile liquids are constantly evaporating into the air and their rate of vaporization increases with temperature. A good indication of the rate of vaporization of a particular liquid is its flash point, or the temperature at which an

ignition source will produce a flash, but not a self-sustained combustion at the surface of the liquid. For example:

a. Regular grade gasoline is the most common accelerant used by the arsonist. The flash point of this fuel is approximately -45° , which means that at ordinary temperatures it vaporizes quite rapidly and small quantities will effectively disappear in a matter of minutes.

b. Kerosene and JP-5 jet fuel are in common use throughout the Navy, and are readily available to the potential arsonist. The flash point of kerosene is approximately 100°F , and the flash point of JP-5 varies between 95 to 145°F ; therefore, the residue of these fuels is relatively easy to detect and collect compared to gasoline.

When volatile liquids are used as accelerants by an arsonist, they are often also used as trailers, or to spread the fire from one area to another. When burned on a floor, volatile liquids leave definite patterns. It is good procedure depending upon the amount and weight of the debris to be removed, and the probability that a liquid accelerant was used, to clear the floor of a burned structure to expose these patterns. (This article was contributed by Special Agent D. V. Stuart, NISHQ)

PROFILE OF NISRA NISRA NEW LONDON CONNECTICUT

The Naval Submarine Base, New London, Groton, Connecticut, traces its beginnings back to 1867 when the State of Connecticut, in an effort to assist the United States Navy in its change from sail to steam, presented several tracts of land on the East bank of the Thames River above the town of Groton, Connecticut, to the Navy. The Navy accepted this gift with thanks; but for many years, due to fiscal constraints, the land went largely unused.

New life was breathed into the Base in 1915 when the monitor Ozark, a floating raft of guns, acting as a tender, arrived with four submarines. These five vessels made up the entire submarine service at that time. Soon other submarines and their tenders gravitated towards the Base and then submarine construction started in the vicinity. These factors encouraged the Navy Department in 1916 to change the purpose of the Base for the last time, this time to a Submarine Base. Since that time, the Base has grown rapidly, particularly when needs of war were thrust upon it.

Today, the Submarine Base at Groton, Connecticut, is the United States' largest. It consists of over 500 acres of land and over 270 buildings. The forces afloat stationed at the Base presently are composed of Submarine Group Two which has assigned to it 12 Fleet Ballistic Missile submarines, each boat having two crews; Submarine Squadrons Two and Ten and Submarine Development

Group Two with a combined total of 33 Fast Attack submarines and surface craft, of which normally one half are moored at the Base.

The Submarine Base also houses the Submarine School where youthful aspirants, both enlisted and officer, receive extensive training before being assigned to a submarine. There are approximately 40,000 students who graduate from the Submarine School annually. In July, 1964, the Station Hospital, the Medical Research Laboratory and the School of Submarine Medicine were consolidated and the Submarine Medical Center was established. The Center is one of the three Naval Medical Centers having component activities or facilities which provide not only clinical care but also have significant capability and effort in research and training.

Approximately 70,000 people are sustained by the Submarine Base, of which approximately 13,500 are military. Located as it is, along the waters of the Long Island Sound in Southeastern Connecticut, the Base is set in an area in which one finds a true capsule of New England culture, history, recreational living. In the surrounding area one can see early American houses built in 1640, mansions built in pre-revolutionary days, the sites of famous revolutionary battles, and a complete and authentic reproduction of a New England seaport from the 19th Century. Numerous small towns on both sides of the Thames River surround the Base and all these towns have fascinating histories of their own.

These areas present an interesting combination of industry, such as the Electric Boat Shipyard, the Dow Chemical plant, and large virgin State recreational parks.

Only two and one half hours North of New York, two hours South of Boston, and within an hour's drive of Hartford, an individual stationed at the Naval Submarine Base, New London, is presented with a myriad of recreational and leisure possibilities for both summer and winter enjoyment.



In order to service this growing and expanding installation, NISRA New London was established on 19 December 1966 as a Class Two NISRA. Prior to that time, two Special Agents assigned to NISRA Hartford, Connecticut, had attempted to meet the constantly growing demands of the Base.

On 19 December 1966, a Senior Resident Agent was assigned and two additional Special Agents were assigned from Hartford to complete the initial complement of agents for NISRA New London. Presently, the manning level of NISRA New London allows for a Senior Resident Agent, GS-13; an Alternate Senior Resident Agent, GS-12; and four Journeyman Agents. Administrative support to the NISRA effort is rendered by an Administrative Assistant, GS-6 and a Stenographer, GS-5. In October of 1972, with the establishment of the Defense Investigative Service, NISRA Hartford, Connecticut, was disestablished and investigative responsibilities throughout the entire State of Connecticut and including Fisher's Island, New York, was assumed by NISRA New London.

The caseload is varied with certain areas such as drug abuse, attaining special significance due to the sensitive missions and demands of the Submarine Service. Often times, cases must receive immediate attention due to the deployment schedules of the boats and required lead time to obtain replacements, especially in the numerous critical billets.

Agents at NISRA New London readily find suitable housing, either rental or purchase, within a 30 minute drive from the office. Types of housing available are as varied as demands, ranging from modern modular living to the countryside where rambling, rustic New England homes still exist with wooded lots and fieldstone fireplaces.

A tour at NISRA New London presents both the seasoned and the new agent an enjoyable and challenging tour of duty. A unique experience presents itself in dealing with members of the "Silent Service" and working within the demands of their world.



PROFILE OF NISRA ROTA, SPAIN

Located in the Administration Building of the U. S. Naval Base, NISRA Rota is the second largest Resident Agency in Europe. Manned by five civilian Special Agents, two Officer Agents, a yeoman and a secretary, NISRA Rota has an average caseload of 700-800/year plus an extremely active CI/CE environment. Geographic area of responsibility includes Spain, the Baleric and Canary Islands, Portugal, the Azores, the Madiera Islands and Gibraltar. Due to convenient access to Military Airlift Command flights, NISRA Rota frequently responds to investigative requirements from Commander Mid-east Force and NCSO Bahrain. Overtime for agent personnel averages 30-40 hours/month, per agent.

Besides the 6100 acres of the base with some 10,000 U. S. personnel (including dependents) and other geographic areas, NISRA Rota provides agent personnel to numerous afloat commands, either when in various Spanish ports or when assistance is required while underway.

The U. S. Naval Station, Rota is located on the Bay of Cadiz (to the west of Gibraltar on the Atlantic Coast) adjacent to the town of Rota (population 20,000). The largest cities in the area are Cadiz (130,000), the oldest (3,000 years continuously inhabited city in Europe, and Jerez (150,000), the home of Spanish sherry. The area boasts a pleasant year round climate, comparable to the coastal area of Southern California.

The office spaces are immediately adjacent to the quarterdeck of the Administration Building, facilitating access for visitors. The Navy Exchange, Commissary and other amenities including the best (only) 18 hole Navy golf course in Europe, are conveniently located. Comfortable on-base quarters and off-base Rental Guarantee Housing (RGH) are available, although there are waiting lists of varying length depending on rank/grade, size of family, etc. Adequate hospital medical facilities are present.

NISRA Rota has three vehicles assigned -- SEAT (Spanish FIAT) model sedans. All are radio equipped and capable of monitoring not only the NIS frequency but the Security Department/Shore Patrol as well. Paging units are also available for use by the duty agent and others.

The NISRA is serviced by the Naval Communication Station, Rota, with SSO service available from FOSIF and a permanently assigned VQ squadron. U. S. mail, international mail and ARFCOS are locally available. Telephone service is provided by the Spanish Telephone Company; however, autovon is accessible from any of the three NISRA extensions.

In addition to the Base Security Department, NISRA Rota is in contact with the Air Force OSI at Torrejon Air Base near Madrid, the various American Embassy Security and CI personnel in Madrid as well as the Spanish Directorate of General Security (DGS), Civil Guard (police) and the High General Staff (HGS) for CI/CE matters. Since many of the Spanish counterparts speak little or

no English, Spanish language capability greatly enhances an agent's effectiveness. In some cases, it is essential.

The base has its own electrical generating plant; water is provided by the Spanish Ministry of Public Works.



PROTECTIVE SERVICES

Subcategory 9A provides for the coverage and reporting of Protective Services by the Naval Investigative Service. The purpose of this article is to briefly acquaint the NIS Special Agent Corps with some of the basic mechanics of protection, which have been developed through trial and error applications by organizations primarily involved in protective or bodyguard work, such as the U. S. Secret Service. It is hoped that a more formalized training program will evolve in the near future and that the Protective Services Section of the reviewed NIS Manual will elaborate on some of the points contained herein.

Who do we Protect

- a. *The President, Vice President and immediate family members.
 - b. *Foreign dignitaries and Presidential Candidates.
 - c. The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations.
 - d. Other high-ranking military officials.
- *Specific tasking by the U. S. Secret Service.

Why do we Protect

There are three primary reasons and two secondary. The primary reasons are:

- a. To prevent intentional injury to the protectee from a potential

assassin or assailant;

- b. To prevent unintentional injury such as the protectee sustaining a fall or accidental injury;

- c. To prevent embarrassment to the protectee.

The secondary reasons are:

- a. To prevent kidnapping;

- b. To assist the protectee in maintaining his schedule, in other words, to preclude unnecessary delays during travel.

Who will Protect

This duty is levied upon the NIS Special Agent in connection with his other myriad duties. The agent must become knowledgeable of the individual whom he is tasked to protect, and be keenly aware of his own demeanor. Good common sense is the key to effective protection. The agent should avoid smoking, chewing gum, unnecessary talking or other traits which would draw undue attention to him while involved in an actual protective detail. When providing these services to dignitaries, extensive press coverage may normally be encountered and the agent should anticipate that his every move may be subject to criticism by the media. His job is to provide protective coverage to the protectee and in so doing, he must exercise a considerable amount of discretion and tact in dealing with the media and the public in general. Offensive, vulgar language and gestures can only bring discredit upon the protectee, the agent and NIS. Inasmuch as the

protection of the individual is of paramount importance, the agent assigned to a protective detail should be proficient in the use of firearms and in good physical condition, in order to perform any arduous tasks imposed upon him. The agent's equipment necessary to accomplish a protective operation at a minimum should include a firearm, sufficient ammunition and a restraining device, (i.e., handcuffs). Depending on the detail, additional equipment may be issued or requested. Some examples would be special weapons, body armor, first aid supplies and items devoted to the protective detail logistics. Regarding attire, the agent will normally wear a moderate, contemporary business suit, not too tight or loose fitting, laced shoes (preferred) with rubber heels (to prevent slipping and unnecessary falls) and will be properly groomed. There will be occasions when the clothing may vary from very formal attire, in which case, the agent will adjust to the prevailing situation. If for example, tuxedos are required for attendance at a formal function, the agent will be authorized to rent this attire if he does not already own formal wear. If by nature of his protective assignment, he is required to attend this type of function, then he should effect arrangements to insure that he is properly attired and will be able to blend into the particular group or surroundings.

How do we Protect

This covers an immense area of techniques, including protective formations, advance surveys, command posts and security check-points, motorcade security and many others.

It is obvious that an inordinate amount of instruction material would have to be issued in order to completely cover these areas in detail, so therefore, it is desired that a basic overview be promulgated at this time. Beginning with protective formations, let us picture the protectee as being the center of three concentric circles of protection. The outer and middle perimeters would include identification and security check-points, which would be utilized in screening personnel and controlling access to the protectee. For purposes of this article let us direct our attention to the inner circle, which is where one actually "works the protectee". Here certain formations are employed, much the same as in any organized sport, only here the protection of the individual's life is at stake. The number of agents assigned to the protective detail will determine the type of formation to be implemented. It is the opinion of the U. S. Secret Service that the very minimum number of personnel that can be utilized effectively in a protective detail would be two Special Agents. The ideal would be from four to six Special Agents. One man should, in most cases, be positioned slightly to the front and to the left side of the protectee, as the protectee's left side is his most vulnerable side.

Examples of formations are depicted at end of this article.

While working a detail the agent must constantly be alert to any danger signs and therefore must be looking outward and not at the protectee. This is a difficult maneuver and requires practice on the part of the agents working the detail.

They must not only become familiar with the habits and idiosyncrasies of the protectee but also with the behavior and reactions of their fellow agents.

In the event of an attack upon the protectee, there are four primary considerations briefly listed as follows:

- a. Arms reach
- b. Sound-off
- c. Cover
- d. Evacuate

The first consideration is very crucial, because most law enforcement personnel are trained to react to a particular incident in such a manner so as to neutralize the assailant. In a protective situation an agent must be aware of the ever present danger of a diversionary attack. An assassin may have an accomplice step from a crowd brandishing a weapon and when the agent leaves the formation responding to the attacker, he thus renders the protectee vulnerable to attack by the assassin. Because of this, the "Arms Reach" consideration must be employed. If the attacker is within arms reach of the agent in the protective formation, then he may attempt to disarm or neutralize the assailant, but only if he does not vacate his protective post. This is perhaps the most difficult task in a protective situation, inasmuch as the normal reaction is to pursue the attacker. The other three considerations follow in close order. When the potential attack or danger is detected, the agent should

"sound-off" - in other words, yell loudly to inform the others of the attack, the object or weapon utilized and the direction of the attack. For example, "gun left" or "object right", which would alert the others so that they can effect the third consideration, that being to cover the protectee and fourthly, to evacuate him from the area. In an assault situation, the protective detail depends on the outer perimeter security and law enforcement personnel to react to the attacker and it is the responsibility of the detail to cover and evacuate the protectee.

Briefing of SECNAV and CNO will be accomplished at Headquarters level regarding the above considerations. Other protectees who are unfamiliar with the foregoing procedures, should be thoroughly briefed regarding the details contemplated reaction to an emergency situation. It should be stressed in briefing the protectee that the detail is providing a security function and not a convenience to the protectee.

To summarize the working of the protectee, the following six points must be remembered:

- a. Protect yourself in order to protect the dignitary.
- b. Your stance should be strong towards the side of the crowd.
- c. Must fight natural instincts.
- d. Must know your initial reaction to a physical assault.
- e. Cover each agent while in formation, but do not leave the formation to assist.

f. Learn the behavior and impulsive mannerisms of the protectee.

Addressing the subject of advances and site surveys, it would be ideal if given the opportunity, to precede the detail in advance of the proposed movement of the protectee. In other words, to dispatch an agent, who would be knowledgeable of the protectee's itinerary and task him with examining the route to be taken, screening of personnel who would have access to the protectee, effecting liaison with the local police and security personnel, as well as conducting numerous other safety and security surveys, which might result in minimizing any danger to the protectee. Realistically speaking, these types of advances are not always conducted due to personnel and budgetary restraints. Therefore, at a minimum, it is incumbent upon the receiving NIS component to at least coordinate the protectee's movement with the local civilian and military security police personnel, and to insure that reliable transportation and secure accommodations are available for the protectee. If presented with a particular threat situation and the manpower is available, then surveys of the areas where the protectee will visit should be conducted. Such surveys would focus on the buildings, vehicles and routes with which the protectee would come in contact. One could compile an extensive list of things to check, but it all may be reduced to good common sense. The agent should place himself in the position of the potential attacker and make

his determinations as to vulnerabilities. It must be clearly understood that if a potential assassin wishes to kill the protectee, the odds are in his favor that he will be successful. The function of the protective service is to reduce or minimize these odds, by undertaking the maximum number of protective countermeasures.





One additional item to be considered in any protective movement, especially with regard to an advance, is to provide a "holding room" for the protectee. This is nothing more than having a room or space set aside at the protectee's destination or at points of delay enroute, where he can be afforded privacy from the general public while waiting to proceed further. This room should ideally be equipped with a comfortable place to sit, a telephone and if possible a restroom for the use of the protectee.

There are an extensive number of techniques and procedures to be employed while driving a protectee either in a formal or informal motorcade. For purposes of brevity, it is desired at a minimum that the driver of the vehicle transporting the protectee be either an agent or a very well screened individual selected by the protectee, his staff or the Naval Investigative Service. Additionally, it is recommended that during any vehicular movement that a follow-up vehicle be utilized. This serves the purpose of providing additional protective personnel and equipment, as well as an alternate means of transportation should the protectee's vehicle be disabled, either intentionally or unintentionally. The follow-up vehicle should be driven in such a manner so as to afford

protection but not to follow so close that it might cause an accident or embarrassment to the protectee.

In conclusion, as noted at the outset, this article is designed to provide merely an overview until such time as more formalized training and guidance may be promulgated. In cases involving dignitaries under the jurisdictional purview of the U. S. Secret Service, assistance will normally be provided on an "as needed" bases and

appropriate liaison will be effected with that agency regarding the specific tasking of NIS personnel. However, the ideas set forth in this article are provided in order to assist NIS personnel in accomplishing protective assignments requested by the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. This tasking will be levied upon NIS Headquarters and the Polygraph Coordinator at NIS Headquarters will serve as the point of contact for this particular phase of protective service.

EXAMPLES OF FORMATIONS ARE DEPICTED BELOW:	
	2 AGENTS WEDGE FORMATION
	3 AGENTS MODIFIED WEDGE FORMATION
	4 AGENTS BOX FORMATION
	5 AGENTS BOX-WEDGE FORMATION

WHERE ARE THEY NOW?

From 18 April to 13 May 1966, the Class shown below, 5(B) 66, met at the Fairmont Building in Arlington, Va. Of the twenty-four Special Agents in attendance, including four counselors, a total of nine remain on-board. Six class members transferred to the Defense Investigative Service, one retired and eight have resigned.



W. A. ANDRE



L. M. ARNOLD



C. R. BOOTH



R. E. CHAMPINE



H. V. DILKES



J. DILL, IV



K. A. FARNSWORTH



R. D. GALLO, JR.



J. W. HAJOSY



H. W. JOHNSON

Office of Naval Intelligence Agents' Basic Training Course

5B-66 18 Apr. - 13 May 1966

Arlington, Virginia



SA L. A. BARKER



SA W. R. CUSHEN



SA E. L. JOHNSON



SA G. R. REIS



Ltjg. G. E. DALTON



D. C. MACLEAN



G. F. MCKENNA



J. P. McMULLEN



J. L. MINOR



W. B. NICHOLSON, JR.



S. M. SAGARA



R. L. SNYDER



J. M. SVETICH



A. D. WINANS



D. L. YEO

	<u>NAME</u>	<u>EOD</u>	<u>NISO/NISRAs ASSIGNED</u>
Top Row, l. to r.	ANDRE, W. A.	10 Jun 65	NISRAs Los Angeles, Pasadena, Long Beach, DIS
	ARNOLD, L. M.	29 Jun 65	NISRAs Norfolk, Louisville, Danang, Pensacola, New Orleans, Gulfport
	BOOTH, C. R.	28 Jun 65	NISRA Corpus Christi, Resigned
	CHAMPINE, R. E.	21 Jun 65	NISHQ, NISRAs Washington, Detroit, Resigned
	DILKES, H. V.	27 Dec 65	NISRAs Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Danang, Atsugi, San Diego, Resigned
2nd Row, l. to r.	DILL, J. IV.	30 Aug 65	NISRAs Chicago, Great Lakes, Denver, Whidbey Island, Okinawa
	FARNSWORTH, K. A.	18 Oct 65	NISRA Moffett Field, Resigned
	GALLO, R. D.	13 Dec 65	NISRAs Chicago, Great Lakes, Danang, New York, Resigned
	HAJOSY, J. W.	18 May 65	NISRAs New York, Hartford, New London, Sasebo, Glynco, Jacksonville
	JOHNSON, H. W.	25 Apr 65	NISRA Dallas, Resigned
3rd Row, l. to r.	BARKER, L. B.	24 Aug 59	NISRAs Charleston, Atlanta, Philadelphia, Garden City, Kodiak, Annapolis, Cherry Point
	CUSHEN, W. R.	28 Jan 53	NISRAs Bainbridge, Camp Lejeune, New Orleans, Retired

	<u>NAME</u>	<u>EOD</u>	<u>NISO/NISRAs ASSIGNED</u>
3rd row (Cont'd)	JOHNSON, E. L.	17 Apr 61	NISRAs Chicago, Great Lakes, Minneapolis, Yokosuka, Alameda
	REIS, G. R.	29 Apr 61	NISRA San Diego, DIS
4th row, l. to r.	MACLEAN, D. C.	2 Jan 66	NISRA New York, Utica, DIS
	MC KENNA, G. F.	13 Jul 65	NISRAs Newport, Quonset Point, DIS
	MC MULLEN, J. P.	18 Oct 65	NISRAs Chicago, Saigon, Yokosuka, New London
	MINOR, J. L.	30 Jul 65	NISRA Port Hueneme, Resigned
	NICHOLSON, W. B.	25 Oct 65	NISRAs Norfolk, Bainbridge, Rota, Kenitra, NISHQ
5th row, l. to r.	SAGARA, S. M.	20 Dec 65	NISRAs Seattle, Bremerton
	SNYDER, R. L.	17 Jan 66	NISRAs Charleston, Orlando, Subic Bay
	SVETICH, J. M.	30 Jan 65	NISRAs San Francisco, Monterey, Resigned
	WINANS, A. D.	1 Jul 65	NISRAs San Francisco, Treasure Island, Hunters Point, DIS
	YEO, D. L.	14 Jun 65	NISRAs Chicago, Denver, DIS

TRANSFERS

	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
FOCHT, Walter S.	NISRA MCRD San Diego	NISRA Greenock
ORRANTIA, Frank E.	NISSU Los Angeles	NISRA Mare Island
STEPHENS, Grant J.	NISPAC	NISHQ
WARD, Hugh P.	NISRA Long Beach	NISRA Yokosuka

NEW HIRES

ARNOLD, Jeffrey S.	NISRA Long Beach
BOREN, Ralph S.	NISRA Norfolk
DAVIS, Jack A.	NISRA Camp Lejeune
FERNANDEZ, Daniel A.	NISRA Alameda
HANNER, Philip C.	NISRA Little Creek
HOMBURG, William J.	NISRA Camp Pendleton
HOPECK, John F.	NISRA Camp Pendleton
JOHNSON, Donald W.	NISRA North Island
LINENBROKER, Scott	NISRA Philadelphia
LUCAS, Richard L.	NISRA NavSta San Diego
MC CARTEN, James B.	NISRA Charleston
MCDONNELL, Robert S.	NISRA Camp Lejeune
MCKENNA, Patrick	NISRA Great Lakes
O'DAY, Dennis	NISRA Norfolk
ROBINS, Neill R.	NISRA Cherry Point
SCOTT, Steven W.	NISRA NavSta San Diego
SIEVERS, James A.	NISRA El Toro
SMITHBERGER, Mark E.	NISRA Washington
SYMONDS, Daniel R.	NISRA St. Louis
WATSON, David E.	NISRA Long Beach