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Op-16-B-7

April 19, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR 'PLANNING' GROUP

Via: Op-16-1
Op-16-B

SUBJECT: Development of Counter-Intelligence Responsibility and Activity Coincident with Advance of United States Forces into Enemy or Enemy Held Areas.

1. The mission of Counter-Intelligence is to uncover and thwart enemy or hostile action against or interference with U.S. Naval Forces in the specific categories of espionage, sabotage and subversion.
2. Since the outbreak of the war Counter-Intelligence effort has perforce been primarily expended in the domestic field to first disrupt activities planted by our enemies before the assault and second to exercise such control over enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive activities as is consistent with the mission and manpower of Counter-Intelligence.
3. Until recently our forces afloat abroad have been engaged in defensive combat, which in many sectors has resulted in withdrawals from originally held positions to such lines as made it possible to consolidate our strength in holding until such time as our waxing power justifies assuming offensive action on the various far flung fronts.
4. Now that the shift to the offensive is imminent, some of the characteristics of the responsibility and activities of Counter-Intelligence that are essential as our forces advance into areas from which our enemies have withdrawn will become apparent. During the defensive phase of operations in general and the urgent need to cover the domestic area in particular, these characteristics and functions have been dormant, but none the less real. It is therefore timely they be examined and reviewed so that the Counter-Intelligence Group of the Naval Intelligence Service will be properly organized, adequately manned and sufficiently trained in these functions to afford the maximum

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protection to the Naval Forces in all phases during the advance to victory, and in the administrative work in enemy areas after victory until such time as permanent civil government can be established.

5. In the phases of the war through which we already have passed, the Counter-Intelligence task has been directed against the enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive organization principally within our own territory. By force of circumstances it has had little to do within actual theatres of operation. The shift to the offensive changes this completely and makes effective Counter-Intelligence in the actual theater of operations and within the areas of occupation by the Naval Forces not only desirable but mandatory for proper protection of these forces as dictated by the Counter-Intelligence mission.

6. It is inconceivable that the enemy in withdrawing from any of the areas now held and controlled will not leave thoroughly trained agents and operatives to conduct aggressive espionage and sabotage on the flanks and in the rear of our advancing forces. Our lines of communication as well as the personnel and material of our combat forces will be the target of such a program. Our personnel and the inhabitants of the areas of enemy withdrawal will be the target of subversive activities designed to disrupt morale and render the rear of the combat force all the more insecure, if, indeed, not in actual jeopardy.

7. As the advance of U.S. Naval forces continues nearer to the homeland and vulnerable strategic areas of our enemies the more desperate will be the need for every means to be exerted to stop or delay our advance. Enemy agents, along with enemy combat forces, will be engaged in the terrific battle of desperation, and "no holds will be barred". Every known, and many surprise, methods of espionage, sabotage and subversive action can be and must be expected and guarded against.

8. The tasks of Counter-Intelligence in the coming offensive warfare by our Naval Forces can be segregated into these general phases as follows:

- (a). Aggressive gathering, collation and dissemination of all available information about hostile, indifferent and friendly individuals, organizations or movements in the areas to be occupied by our Naval Forces before the actual offensive

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10. In phase (a) every available source of information must be utilized - broadcasts by enemy and neutral radio stations, interviews with persons having knowledge of personalities, available in areas not controlled by the enemy, MIS, OSS, State Department and other federal files, the Who's Who of F Group units and so on. This information should be collated, evaluated and disseminated to Force Commanders in time for inclusion in their estimate of the situation.

11. A start has been made by Op-16-A-7 along these lines, but it is merely a start. Preparation of this material would provide excellent training for Counter-Intelligence personnel assigned to overseas duty in phases (b) and (c).

12. Personnel assigned to duty in the (b) phase must be well grounded in the principles of Counter-Intelligence work, have the maximum knowledge available concerning the area and people in the zone of operation and good command of the predominant language or dialect. They must be individuals who can function in spite of the strain of combat conditions.

13. Personnel required for duty in the (c) phase must have the same qualifications as those assigned for duty in the (b) phase, except they probably will not be under as high a degree of strain.

14. The B-7 Advanced School conducted by Op-16-A-8 is providing basic instruction in Counter-Intelligence which must be a basic requirement for all officer personnel. Comparatively minor changes and additions to the present curriculum would provide ample training preliminary to such specialized training as would be required for duty in a specific operational area. This specialized training, it is believed, can best be accomplished in ONI and in connection with phase (a) work.

15. It is felt that adequate special training for any one of the phases can be provided without danger of compromising any information concerning future operation through effective functioning of the Planning Group in relation to Cominch.

16. On the basis of experience in the Northwest African area, incomplete as the knowledge is, it is felt that by fully utilizing present B-7 personnel in ONI and the District Intelligence Offices in the (a) phase, a pool of 75 or 80 thoroughly trained Counter-Intelligence officers will be adequate for phases (a) and (b) and sufficient for the first requirements of phase (c). It is impossible to make a reasonable

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estimate of personnel requirements for phase (c) because of unpredictable factors - such as length of time of occupation and Naval Government, extent of occupied areas, communication facilities, temper of natives, speed with which enemy agents and influences can be rounded up, eradicated or controlled. Personnel for (b) and (c) phase could and should be interchangeable, but inasmuch as personnel required for the (b) phase will be comparatively few in numbers such personnel cannot be counted on for very great augmentation for personnel required in the (c) phase.

17. The estimate of Counter-Intelligence personnel for the three periods is predicated on Counter-Intelligence being conducted as a staff function, operating in such Intelligence Centers as required for all three periods, especially the (a) phase in coordinating and directing Counter-Intelligence activities carried on by general Intelligence personnel. This in turn is predicated on the hypothesis that all Naval Intelligence personnel will be sufficiently trained in Counter-Intelligence to recognize the Counter-Intelligence value or implication of material handled by them in the course of their regular and normal duties.

18. Use of Counter-Intelligence personnel as outlined above is the logical extension of Counter-Intelligence activities on a world-wide basis as directed in the recent reorganization of the Naval Intelligence Service. It augments the work in the domestic field, which of course, must also be continued. However the basic Op-16-8-7 organization is such that it will carry without undue strain the added headquarters work of the proposed plan, and to a certain extent the field work as well. As a matter of fact the section is developing its files along these lines at the present time.

19. It is recommended the above be given consideration in the formulation of plans and policies for Naval Intelligence work in advanced areas, to insure proper inclusion of Counter-Intelligence units in such organizations as are contemplated.

Respectfully,

Wallace S. Wharton