

In addition to the light thrown on security and Counter Intelligence in the U.S. by the landings of the 8 Nazi saboteurs it is believed that certain comments ^{should} ~~could~~ be made on the handling of the case from the point of view of Intelligence of a positive nature. After the landing of the 8 agents became known, the first objective was quite properly to catch them. Through the voluntary surrender of DASCH and his description of the whole plot this capture was effected before any of the saboteurs had a chance to attack their objectives or even to become well established in the U.S. ~~and~~ Subsequent to their capture it was, of course, important from a Counter-Intelligence point of view to determine the contacts which they had made in the U.S. and to obtain from them all information which would make it possible to improve the security of the U.S. This part of the job appears on the whole to have been well done. The capture of these 8 Nazi saboteurs offered, however, an opportunity to obtain information concerning the enemy which was largely neglected. There also existed the possibility that the 8 saboteurs and particularly the two who were out of sympathy with the Nazi Government could be used to obtain further information from the enemy concerning their intentions in the U.S. This latter possibility was eliminated with the announcement of the capture of the 8 agents and with the execution of 6 of them.

It appears unfortunate that any publicity at all was given either to the landing of the 8 agents or to their subsequent arrest. It is recognized that the movements of the representatives of various Counter-Intelligence organizations around Amagansett, together with some of the subsequent investigations, must have aroused considerable comment that probably lead to the leakage of information. Furthermore, it is recognized that undoubtedly circumstances arose both before and after the apprehension of the 8 agents (information as to which

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is not now available in the Office of Naval Intelligence) which made it necessary to announce the capture of these 8 agents. Nevertheless, it would have been of advantage if the German Government could have remained in ignorance of their capture, ~~and~~ thus enabling contact to be established with the mail drops and possibly with later groups coming to the U.S. It also appears to be unfortunate that by giving DASCH and BURGER a lighter sentence and announcing that this had been done because of their cooperation with American authorities, Germany was in effect informed that these two individuals had given full information to American authorities. Knowing this, it would appear almost certain that the German sabotage organization would modify its plans and also that it would countermand any orders ^{to proceed to the U.S.} that might have been issued to individuals with whom members of this group were familiar. Thus, it would seem highly improbable that KAPPE, BARTH or SCHMIDT would now be sent to the U.S. While the above developments were unfortunate, they were probably unavoidable and it is useless to wish that things might have been different.

More important was the failure to use to the utmost these 8 Nazi saboteurs as sources of ^MMilitary and ^NNaval ^IIntelligence. There is no evidence that at any time between their capture and their final execution or sentence, were they questioned or examined by representatives of either the Military Intelligence Service or the Office of Naval Intelligence. Except for what information may have been extracted from them during the course of their trial, ^{their} and examination was entirely in the hands of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The latter agency was naturally primarily interested in ^ddomestic security and ⁱⁿ obtaining information relative to the violation of any Federal Statutes by persons within the U.S. Nevertheless, it would appear that, inasmuch as MIS and ONI were excluded from access to these individuals, ~~that~~ FBI had an obligation to obtain all information possible of an ^IIntelligence nature.

DASCH and BURGER were the only ones who may be said to have given ~~any~~

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~~information~~ or any substantial amount of information concerning conditions in Germany. DASCH on his own initiative and under intelligent questioning supplied a large amount of information relative to Germany and to the voyage over on the submarine. BURGER gave a certain amount of interesting information concerning the rivalries within the Nazi Party and between the Party and the Army. There is, however, no evidence at present available to indicate that any strong effort was made to obtain information relative to conditions in Germany from the other 6 saboteurs, who have now been eliminated as possible sources of information. In view of DASCH's long and fairly detailed account, it would have been extremely useful to have checked his statements by questioning ^{of} the other agents. Two of the others had been in positions where they might have obtained information of great strategic value - NEUBAUER in the Army and KERLING in the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin. They had all traveled more or less in Germany in recent months. Little effort appears to have been made to have checked DASCH's and BURGER's comments on the food and morale situation with the other agents. Even in the cases of DASCH and BURGER many possible leading fields of questioning appear to have been ignored. Thus, no one of them was asked concerning the effect of the bombings by the RAF of LÜBECK and ROSTÖCK. There is no evidence that any of them were questioned concerning the volume of industrial output in Germany either as to ships, planes, or armaments; yet two of the agents had worked for a considerable length of time in a motor vehicle factory where they must have been able to have obtained some idea of the rate of production. DASCH gave considerable ^{data} information concerning the construction and operation of the submarine on which his group came to the U.S. Most of the other agents must have had equal opportunity for observation aboard the submarine, yet not even sufficient information was elicited from them to check that furnished by DASCH. It would have been interesting to have obtained data concerning the submarine on which KERLING and his group traveled in order

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that it might be compared ^{with} to that obtained on the other submarine. Similarly DASCH was the only one of the agents from whom information was obtained concerning the German Intelligence and sabotage organization. A number of the other agents had been active members of the Bund or the Friends of New Germany, while resident in the U.S. It would have been ^{useful} interesting to have obtained from them information concerning the activities of other former Bund members who had returned to Germany and the extent to which the German High Command is using persons formerly resident in the U.S.

It is recognized that the 6 saboteurs who were executed might well have refused to answer questions of the type suggested above. They appear to have been loyal to the Nazi Regime and might well have been unwilling to give information that would be used against it. There is, however, no evidence at hand showing that an attempt was made to obtain this information. As to a fuller questioning of DASCH and BURGER it may be suggested that the opportunity for this still exists. One wonders, however, whether they were not ^{more} eager to cooperate with American authorities before being sentenced to 30 years imprisonment and life imprisonment respectively than at the present time.

Much the same situation applies to the materials and equipment which the saboteurs brought with them as applies to the agents themselves. This material was seized very promptly. Its ~~is~~ general nature was announced to the public. It was obviously of importance, as an exhibit in the legal proceedings against the saboteurs. It was, however, also of importance, as a potential source of information to Military and Naval authorities on the materials and devices developed by the German sabotage organization. Requests were made by representatives of the Navy, and possibly also by the Army although this is not known, ^{for} ~~and~~ permission to examine this material. This permission was not granted until the trial of the saboteurs had been completed. Hence, it was almost two months after the discovery of these explosives and incendiary equipment before they were made available

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to representatives of the appropriate bureaus of the Army and Navy.

The above comments are not made so much for the sake of criticizing of the handling of this case as for the sake of indicating the possible precautions which should be taken in ^{the} event that another similar opportunity arises. It is believed that if such cases are to be handled exclusively by the FBI, one of two procedures should be adopted. Either qualified representatives of the MIS and ONI should be given an opportunity to interrogate such agents for information of interest to their particular services, or the FBI should be informed of the type of information which MIS and ONI are interested in obtaining and be requested to make every effort to obtain such information. It is believed that the former course would be preferable inasmuch as properly qualified Military or Naval personnel ^{would} probably be in a better position to evaluate the information as it was obtained and in the light of what was previously known. ^{At} In all events, it is suggested that in the future a case such as this one should be treated not only as a violation of our domestic laws and a threat to our internal security but as an opportunity for obtaining ^L intelligence concerning the enemy.

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